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Abstract 
The article explores the implications of the rise of Russian anti-access/area-denial 
(A2/AD) capabilities for NATO’s Eastern Frontier, especially the broader Black Sea 
region. The reality is indicative of a broader global trend where assertive revisionist 
powers are not only questioning the post-1989 rules-based international order, but are 
also developing the antidotes to the so-called American Way of War, one that largely 
shapes the NATO operational profile. This type of ecosystem is at the forefront of what 
Russia has been doing over the past few years in Kaliningrad and Crimea – developing 
concepts of operations, especially the A2/AD component, that challenge NATO’s way 
of reassuring its frontline allies. The problem is that the NATO caucus in the Black Sea 
remains highly fragmented in its threat perception. Increasingly close economic and 
political ties to Russia combined with diplomatic discord concerning the US and NATO 
makes Turkey a less reliable ally. Meanwhile, Bulgaria’s long tradition of close cultural 
and economic ties to Russia remains concerning. At the same time, NATO needs to do 
more. The West must understand that its smaller allies don’t have the luxury of time or 
economic power, and must adapt its approach accordingly to credibly reassure its Black 
Sea allies. 
 
Keywords: A2/AD, precision guided munitions (PGMs), Russia, Black Sea, Romania, 
NATO, offset strategy. 
 
 
The world in which the North Atlantic Alliance exists has 
fundamentally changed since the 1990s or even early 2000s. The Crimean 
annexation by Russia in 2014 marked not only the return of traditional 
geopolitical competition, but also the rise of a new operational and security 
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ecosystem. This article aims to explore the implications of the rise of anti-
access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities for NATO’s Eastern Flank and 
especially for the broader Black Sea region.  
 The two core strategic documents of the Trump Administration, the 
National Security Strategy (NSS, presented at the end of 2017) and the National 
Defense Strategy (NDS, launched in early 2018), provide a realistic diagnosis of 
the contemporary security environment. Understanding this reality is of utmost 
importance for Europe because, at the end of the day, it is the setting in which 
NATO ultimately is operating. From the NSS perspective the world has once 
again become a place shaped by great power rivalries and competitions “across 
political, economic and military arenas” with the purpose of shifting “regional 
balances power in their favor.”1 At the core it remains fundamentally a contest 
between revisionist and status quo powers, between repressive systems and free 
societies, between the powers that favor a rules-based international order and 
the ones for which power rules. For the Pentagon the stakes of the reemerged 
long-term inter-state strategic competition are about the nature and character of 
the international order for which the contemporary revisionist powers have 
other plans, especially in their near-abroads: “China and Russia want to shape a 
world consistent with their authoritarian model - gaining veto authority over 
other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions.”2But the most 
important feature is that this broader contestation and weakening of the post-
WWII and post-Cold War orders happens at a very specific moment in time – 
when the traditional ways to provide security and reassure allies, especially the 
ones that have underwritten NATO deterrence for decades, are in crisis. As the 
NSS points out, the revisionist powers are developing the antidotes to the so-
called American Way of War (one that also largely shapes the NATO 
operational profile) by “fielding military capabilities designed to deny America 
access in times of crisis and to contest our ability to operate freely in critical 
commercial zones during peacetime.”3 In its major planning and strategic 
guiding documents, the Pentagon is recognizing a shifting global environment 
where traditional US military advantages are contested:  
 
“for decades the United States has enjoyed uncontested or dominant superiority in every 
operating domain. We could generally deploy our forces when we wanted, assemble 
                                               
1  “National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, White House, December 
2017, p. 25, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-
2017-0905.pdf.  (Accessed 15 August 2018). 
2  Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, 
“Sharpening the American Military’s Competitiveness”, Department of Defense, January 
2018, p. 2, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-
Strategy-Summary.pdf. (Accessed 15 August 2018). 
3  “National Security Strategy of the United States of America…cit.”, p. 27. 
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them where we wanted, and operate how we wanted. Today, every domain is 
contested—air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace.”4 
 
While the United States and its allies were deeply engaged in the post-9/11 
stabilization campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, powers like China and Russia 
invested in developing alternative recipes (new capabilities, systems and ways 
of fighting) to the American traditional competitive advantages, especially the 
ability to project its power in key strategic theaters like the Eastern Flank of 
NATO or the Indo-Pacific.
5
 This new ecosystem is at the forefront of what 
Russia has been doing over the past few years in the immediate proximity of 
NATO territory, particularly in Kaliningrad and Crimea – developing concepts 
of operations, especially the A2/AD component, that challenge NATO’s way of 
reassuring and deterring particularly in the frontline regions.    
 From the perspective of the international relations field, this article 
operates broadly within the principled realism framework at the core of both the 
National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy. This principled 
realism provides an overarching framework that should guide most of the 
policies of the Trump Administration. The classical realist strand recognizes the 
natural state of the global politics to be a state competition as well as a contest 
for power and influence. In this context, regional balances of power become the 
focus of the power competitions. All are foundational features that shape how 
the NSS and NDS see the current strategic environment. For the Trump 
Administration, this emergent philosophy was popularized in a famous op-ed 
written by Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster and Gary Cohn in early 2017 in 
Wall Street Journal stating that “the world is not a global community but an 
arena where nations, nongovernmental actors and businesses engage and 
compete for advantage. Rather than deny this elemental nature of international 
affairs, we embrace it.”6 At the same time, the realist diagnosis of the world is 
tamed by values and principles. Both documents are anchored in “the 
realization that American principles are a lasting force for good in the world”7 
and are committed to preserving an international order with favorable balances 
of power in the key regions that embrace those principles. 
 
 
                                               
4  “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America…cit.”, 
p. 3. 
5  Briefing on National Defense Strategy by Elbridge Colby, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Strategy and Force Development, Washington Foreign Press Center, 29 
January 2018, https://fpc.state.gov/277746.htm. (Accessed 15 August 2018). 
6  H.R. McMaster and Gary Cohn, “America First Doesn’t Mean America Alone”, Wall 
Street Journal, 30 May 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/america-first-doesnt-mean-
america-alone-1496187426. (Accessed 28 August 2018). 
7  “National Security Strategy of the United States of America…cit.”, p. 1. 
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Echoes From Different Eras 
 
It is said that although history does not repeat itself it often rhymes. To 
many observers, the vibe of our time is not very different from the pre-1914 
world, a multipolar system marked by intense strategic rivalries and great power 
competitions. Revisionism is back, while long repressed imperial dreams and 
impulses are returning at full speed. Both China and Russia want to dominate 
their near-abroad. Everything is compounded by the assertiveness of a particular 
type of nationalism – “ugly, unhealthy, xenophobic”8 that is dominated by 
impulsive, violent, destructive sentiments. Both contemporary revisionist 
powers are mobilizing disgruntled historical narratives (China is talking about a 
century of humiliations while Russia has resurrected the memory of the 1990s) 
against the so-called liberal international order, one perceived as essentially 
unjust, imposed at a time of structural weakness, and inimical to their value 
system.  
 At the same time, there is increasingly a wide consensus that the current 
strategic setting is very similar with what happened at the end of the 1970s. 
Two recent initiatives were shaped by this immediate perception. For example, 
in its last few years, the Obama Administration’s Pentagon focused significantly 
on trying to come up with what has been called an offset strategy to 
counterbalance the advantages of the contemporary competitors. The inspiration 
came from the solutions developed by the Carter Administration in the late 
1970s when it produced the 2
nd
 offset strategy. Overall, there was an increased 
perception of NATO’s decreasing capacity to deter the Soviet Union at a time 
when the US was dealing with the aftermath of the Vietnam defeat and Moscow 
was investing massively in its conventional capabilities:  
 
“while we were in Vietnam, the Soviet Union spent a huge amount of money in 
conventional equipment and technology. By the mid-1970s, there was a pervasive sense 
that the Soviet Union had achieved conventional superiority. This occurred around the 
same time the Soviets achieved strategic nuclear parity. Under these circumstances, 
underwriting NATO conventional deterrence with the threat of battlefield nuclear 
weapons simply wasn’t credible anymore. In this new context, the U.S. sought to 
reassert conventional dominance in order to improve strategic stability”.9 
 
The architect of the Obama Administration’s offset strategy, Robert Work 
recognized that he was deeply inspired by the successes of the Carter 
                                               
8  Author interview with Kunihiko Miyake, Research Director at the Canon Institute for 
Global Studies, Tokyo, Japan, April 2017. 
9  Robert O. Work, “The Role of Offset Strategies in Restoring Conventional Deterrence”, 
Small Wars Journal, 4 January 2018, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/role-offset-
strategies-restoring-conventional-deterrence. (Accessed 15 August 2018). 
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Administration in finding a way out of its broader strategic predicament.
10
 A 
very similar reading was also at the forefront of the current National Defense 
Strategy. As Elbridge Colby, the main writer and coordinator of the strategy 
emphasized –  
 
“from a strategic perspective, today we face a situation not unlikely the one in the late 
1970s when there was a real perception of the decline of the Western deterrent. Then 
was mostly about the deterioration of our nuclear advantage, today is more about the 
increased link between competitive conventional balance combined with the efforts of 
the competitors to leverage their nuclear forces”.11  
 
The decline of the Western deterrence posture is triggered mainly by 
what observers call the proliferation and the democratization of the effects of 
the previous Revolution in Military Affairs (whose seeds were planted in the 
late 1970s and achieved maturity during the first Iraq War with the Desert 
Storm Operation against Saddam Hussein). While the West developed and 
invested ever since then in the Desert Storm model, the potential 
adversaries/competitors studied this particular way of warfare very closely and 
came up with the antidotes using the very same key components of the RMA in 
a different way, developing their own precision guided munitions (PGM) battle 
networks. The broad outcome was an opportunity “for states, and even sub-
states, to establish wide anti-access envelopes that will prevent an adversary 
from closing with their territory, or at least doing so only at a high or even 
mission defeating cost.”12 For example, over the almost 30 years since the Gulf 
War the Chinese have become the preeminent purveyors of anti-access and area 
denial in the world. They have invested heavily in new technologies including 
advanced surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems such as the S-400 purchased 
from Russia, which has an effective operational range (i.e. the ability to engage 
and destroy a target) of 400 kilometers,
13
 fourth and fifth-generation fighter 
aircraft such as the Russian-made Su-30MKK and the internally developed 
                                               
10  Robert O. Work remarks at a roundtable discussion for Harold Brown: Offsetting the 
Soviet Military Challenge, 1977-1981, 5 March 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch? 
v=fwfTLnV1YS0, (Accessed 15 August 2018) : “we’ve adapted very much the thinking 
of the Carter Administration and our thinking was very analogous to the time. (...) we just 
essentially applied today most of the thinking of Secretary Brown and Dr. Perry.” 
11  Elbridge Colby, former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Strategy and Force Development 
at the US STRATCOM Deterrence Symposium 2018, 2 August 2018, https://www.dvidshub.net/ 
video/61 7007/usstratcom-2018-deterrence-symposium-speed-change. (Accessed 15 
August 2018).  
12  Albert Pallazo, “Precision and the Consequences for the Modern Battlefield”, Small Wars 
Journal, 19 August 2016, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/precision-and-the-
consequences-for-the-modern-battlefield. (Accessed 15 August 2018).  
13  Timothy R. Heath, “How China’s New Russian Air Defense System Could Change Asia,” 
War on the Rocks, 21 January 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/01/how-chinas-new-
russian-air-defense-system-could- change-asia/. (Accessed 15 August 2018). 
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Chengdu J-20, and other assets including ballistic missiles, at least four new 
classes of submarines, aircraft carriers, and other warships including Type-022 
Houbei fast attack craft equipped with cruise missiles.
14
 These military assets 
combine to create a layered defense that is designed to prevent an enemy from 
obtaining or maintaining the ability to operate in close proximity to China, to 
then meet that enemy at a significant distance from the Chinese shore, and 
slowly attrite their forces as they stay consistently engaged in the Chinese 
A2/AD zone.
15
 
 
 
Why It Matters For NATO 
 
There are immediate regional as well as global consequences that the 
maturing of these capabilities is generating. From the alliance’s perspective 
what is at stake is the so-called American Way of War, the type of operations 
associated with what, in the public imagination reminds of the Desert Storm 
model – the overwhelming use of military power for producing decisive results 
in conditions of massive superiority in all domains. This overwhelming 
superiority used to be an inherent advantage of the Western unipolar military 
power, especially during the 1990s. Now it is increasingly questioned. As 
retired general Ben Hodges, the former commander of the US Army Europe 
recently said:  
 
“we have always relied so much on air power and sea power. Russia and China have 
developed significant A2/AD capabilities that would limit, at least for a period, our 
ability to fully employ all our air and sea power potential. They’ve developed military 
capabilities, systems and doctrines aimed at undermining the American way of 
projecting power to defend US allies’ interests. Credible air defense layers and anti-ship 
missiles are part of their asymmetric approach in countering the American Way of 
War”.16  
  
Traditionally, a key feature of US military operations is the ability to project its 
power from afar, from the American homeland to intercontinental distances on 
the rimlands and peripheries of Eurasia. The rise of mature access-denial 
bubbles is undermining the whole logic of this way of providing security. They 
                                               
14  Toshi Yoshihara, “Anti-access Lessons from the Past,” Proceedings Magazine, vol. 139, 
no. 12, 2013, https://www.usni.org/node/28403. (Accessed 15 August 2018). 
15  James R. Holmes, “U.S. Confronts an Anti-Access World,” The Diplomat, 9 March 2012, 
https://thediplomat.com/2012/03/u-s-confronts-an-anti-access-world/?allpages=yes. 
(Accessed 15 August 2018). 
16  Octavian Manea, “A Tour of Horizon Interview with Lieutenant General Ben Hodges on 
NATO Adaptation and the Russian Way of Warfare”, Small Wars Journal, 7 August 2018, 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/small-wars-journal-interview-lieutenant-general-ben-
hodges-nato-adaptation-and-russian-way. (Accessed 15 August 2018). 
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create a type of no-go areas, or killing-zone – “areas that it would be too 
difficult or costly to project power across, with the result being a balkanization 
of the world.”17 In extremis, for some observers, the diffusion of this 
operational pattern especially in regions associated with resurgent great-powers 
may ultimately question “the ability and capacity of US to remain a Eurasian 
military power”18 constraining its potential to intervene at long distances. This 
is an operational problem acknowledged by the senior Pentagon leadership 
since the Obama years: 
 
“Russian and Chinese adopted 2OS thinking and technologies to erect A2/AD networks 
to confront our own battle networks. They do so to deter, forestall and disrupt any US 
power projection operation near their own territory. (…) This is a serious operational 
problem, and a direct challenge to a global superpower that relies on its ability to 
project power into distant theaters to underwrite both its alliances and conventional 
deterrence”.19 
 
Historically, the times of perceived parity (in this case, parity in the second 
offset battle networks) between strategic rivals can trigger the escalatory 
movements of one side (especially one incentivized by the conscious 
understanding that traditional ways of deterrence may no longer work). This 
escalation amplifies a highly volatile security dilemma cycle: “power shifts 
double the chance of war. Shifts toward parity are most likely to start wars. 
Ahistorical example of this effect was Germany’s drive to build a fleet the equal 
of Great Britain’s at the start of the twentieth century”.20 
This is a point that has a special meaning for the strategic frontiers, for 
the outer limits of the US system of alliances, especially the ones that are in the 
proximity of great-powers that manifest hegemonic and anti status-quo 
instincts, like NATO’s Eastern Flank. From a NATO perspective, reassurance 
and deterrence should be massively rethought in an age when Russian A2/AD 
capabilities can neutralize the Alliance potential to defend the Baltic states. This 
is the reason that the Baltic ecosystem was at the epicenter of the most 
important post-2014 NATO summits. The defensive package that was 
developed is a flexible mix of rapid reaction forces, limited advanced forward 
tripwire presence, new command and control architecture as well as pre-
positioned equipment to be used in a crisis scenario. It remains essentially a 
very traditional answer based on the promise of power projection (as NATO 
                                               
17  Albert Pallazo, “Precision and the Consequences…cit.”. 
18  Stephen Rosen, “Military Innovation and the Future of US Power Projection”, Modern 
War Institute, West Point, 18 September 2017, https://mwi.usma.edu/video-stephen-
rosen-military-innovation-future-us-power-projection/. (Accessed 15 August 2018). 
19  Work, “The Role of Offset Strategies…cit.”. 
20  James Lacey (ed.), Great Strategic Rivalries. From the Classical World to the Cold War, 
New York, Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 3-4. 
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preserved its Cold War defense-in- depth alignment and still has the bulk of its 
forces postured in Old Europe and not in the East
21
) and the reinforcement of 
the flanks.
22
 The problem is that the Russian A2/AD systems are meant to keep 
away and complicate the power projection and reinforcement abilities of the 
Alliance, closing air and sea access to the flanks and exposing NATO with a 
potential “reinforcement trap”:  
 
“in the case of a major crisis, such as Russia grabbing hand, they could break their way 
through the Russian bubble by launching a high-intensity electronic-warfare and 
bombing campaign to destroy the air-defense and land-based cruise-missile systems 
based in Kaliningrad, which would threaten allied forces. (…) Alternatively, the allies 
could accept the Russian fait accompli and try to negotiate a withdrawal”.23 
 
Both scenarios would have dramatic consequences for European security. The 
first one implies a direct attack on Russian territory triggering the potential 
escalation of hostilities while the second would mean the end of NATO as we 
know it. Both scenarios would confront the Alliance with massive existential 
dilemmas. 
There are signs that by choosing to emphasize an A2/AD posture at the 
strategic interaction points with NATO territory Russia could be “capable of 
sealing off the Baltic states in the bubble that covers air, sea and land 
dimensions”.24 At the same time by deploying these capabilities “Russia could 
also be in a position to exploit any regional crisis, whether manufactured or not, 
declaring air and sea exclusion zones in the region, on the pretext of preventing 
military escalation”.25 
There is also another immediate potential threat that should be taken 
into consideration. The rise of access-denial capabilities is a danger for the 
global commons, for the international sea and air lanes, for the freedom of 
navigation that is at the core of international commerce. The proliferation of the 
A2/AD bubbles and their impact for the regional commons remains a major 
                                               
21  Ben Hodges, Janusz Bugajski and Peter B. Doran, “Securing the Suwalki Corridor. 
Strategy, Statecraft, Deterrence and Defense”, Center for European Policy Analysis, 
Washington, D.C., July 2018, p. 20. 
22  Armand Goșu and Octavian Manea, “The consequences of the Militarization of Crimea 
for the Wider Black Sea Region”, Studia Politica, vol. XV, no.1, 2015, pp.14-15. 
23  Fabrice Pothier, “An Area-Access Strategy for NATO”, Survival, vol.59, no. 3, 2017, p. 76. 
Wesley Clark, Jüri Luik, Egon Ramms and Richard Shirreff, “Closing NATO’s Baltic 
Gap”,  International Centre for Defence and Security, Tallinn, May 2016, p. 12, 
http://www.icds.ee/filead 
Min/media/icds.ee/failed/ICDS_Report-Closing_NATO_s_Baltic_Gap.pdf. (Accessed 15 
August 2018). 
25  Study for the Swedish Armed Forces, “Future security challenges in the Baltic Sea 
Region”, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre at British Ministry of Defense, 
November 2015, p. 20, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_ 
data/file/494595/20151201-Baltic_sea_regional_security.pdf. (Accessed 15 August 2018). 
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concern for the Alliance, especially when assessing the military build-ups that 
Russia prioritized after 2014, particularly in Kaliningrad and Crimea:  
 
“as we see the proliferation of weapons of asymmetric warfare, and I would say 
submarines, mines, anti-ship cruise missiles, and very sophisticated and accurate coastal 
radars, in some areas of the world, including in the Baltics and in the Black Sea, and 
now also in the Eastern Mediterranean, we are observing an Anti-Access/Area Denial 
strategy, which is one that we need to keep an eye on because it can restrict the ability 
of commerce and freedom of navigation and sea lines of communication that are in 
international waters.  Those waters are called international waters for a reason.  They 
belong to no one and they are there for all nations to be able to navigate with 
commercial vessels that contribute to prosperity, and as well, naval vessels that 
contribute to security”.26 
 
Last but not least, the build-up of highly dense access-denial umbrellas is a key 
advantage during war times, but it may also have immediate peace-time effects. 
It could be a decisive capability for coercive purposes altering regional 
behaviors, shifting loyalties and incentivizing contextual bandwagoning 
positions in decisive moments. As former NATO SACEUR General Breedlove 
emphasized:  
 
“anti-access/area-denial is a two-edge sword. In times of peace it is a coercive 
capability/force meaning that they have the ability to affect our use of the Black Sea. It 
is important in the Black Sea not to allow that coercion to influence what we do. We 
have to assert that we can and will operate in these areas. The Alliance itself needs to 
develop a more robust capability to be able to defend against the A2/AD if we ever had 
to do that. That requires investment, training to take down an air-defense network and a 
deeper more robust stock of long-range strike capability”.27 
 
 
Russia And Its Politics 
 
When Crimean voters went to the polls on March 16, 2014 neither of 
the two options presented on the referendum allowed for maintaining the 
current status quo. Voters could either vote to join Russia immediately or to 
return Crimea to its status under the 1992 Crimean Constitution,
28
 which 
granted the “Republic of Crimea…sovereign powers over its territory (including 
                                               
26  Remarks by Vice Admiral James G. Foggo, III, the Commander of the Naval Striking & 
Support Forces NATO, 8 June 2016, https://nato.usmission.gov/june-8-2016-vice-
admiral-james-g-foggo-iii-baltops-2016/. (Accessed 15 August 2018).  
27  Author interview with General Philip Breedlove, former NATO SACEUR, April 2017. 
28 “Crimea Referendum: What Does the Ballot Paper Say?” BBC, 10 Mar 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26514797. (Accessed 15 August 2018). 
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all resources) and independent foreign relations.”29 In essence, Crimeans were 
presented with two options – join Russia now or join Russia later. The presence 
of Russian military and paramilitary forces in Crimea at the time already made 
any referendum result suspicious, legally unenforceable, and unrecognizable in 
any way as a free and fair election. Representatives from the US (including 
President Obama) and the EU decried the referendum as illegitimate and illegal 
while simultaneously condemning Russia’s actions violating Ukrainian 
sovereignty.
30
 The UN went so far as to propose a non-binding resolution that 
affirmed Ukraine’s territorial integrity and said the Crimean referendum “had 
no validity”.31 The results of the referendum showed that 83% of eligible 
Crimeans went to the polls to vote in the referendum and more than 97% of 
those who voted supported Crimean secession from Ukraine.
32
 The fact that 
such an overwhelming result is unheard of in any type of truly democratic 
election only served to discredit the referendum even further. The true outcome 
of the referendum was released, potentially inadvertently, at a later date by The 
Council under the President of the Russian Federation for the Development of 
Civil Society and Human Rights (Russian Human Rights Council) in a report 
which stated that voter turnout in Crimea was only 30%, not 83%, and support 
for secession among those voters was only about 50%, not close to the 97% 
reported in official results.
33
 The Russian Human Rights Council has since put a 
disclaimer on its website claiming that the report is not an official document and 
that there is no assessment or presumption of “objectivity and accuracy”.34All of 
                                               
29  Gwendolyn Sasse, The Crimea Question: Identity, Transition, and Conflict, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge MA, 2007, p. 146. 
30  John B. Bellinger, III and Jonathan Masters, “Why the Crimean Referendum is 
Illegitimate”, Council on Foreign Relations, 16 Mar 2014, 
https://www.cfr.org/interview/why-crimean-referendum-illegitimate., accessed 20 August 
2018; “Crimea Referendum: Voters ‘Back Russia Union’,” BBC, 16 Mar 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26606097. (Accessed 20 August 2018). 
31  “Backing Ukraine’s Territorial Integrity, UN Assembly Declares Crimea Referendum 
Invalid”, UN News, 27 Mar 2014, https://news.un.org/en/story/2014/03/464812-backing-
ukraines-territorial-integrity-un-assembly-declares-crimea-referendum. (Accessed 20 
August 2018). 
32  Andras Racz, “Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine: Breaking the Enemy’s Ability to Resist”, 
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, FIIA Report 43, Helsinki, 2015, p. 64. 
33  Paul Roderick Gregory, “Putin’s ‘Human Rights Council’ Accidentally Posts Real 
Crimean Election Results”, Forbes, 5 Mai 2014, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
paulroderickgregory/2014/05/05/putins-human-rights-council-accidentally-posts-real-
crimean-election-results-only-15-voted-for-annexation/#6a89fd8fl727. (Accessed 20 
August 2018).  
34  Evgeniy Alexandrovich Bobrov, “Problems of Crimean Residents”, Council Under the 
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these issues – an unprompted invasion with military troops, a forceful takeover 
of the Crimean Parliament, a referendum conducted under duress and with 
falsified results, and the ensuing international outcry – would be problematic for 
Russia and its goals in Crimea if Russia was concerned with anything more than 
creating a thin veneer of political legitimacy to its actions. 
In reality, there was no chance of political legitimacy anywhere except 
in Russian propaganda. This was assured by the 1994 Budapest Memorandum 
signed by the United States, Russia, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom, which 
guaranteed the denuclearization of Ukraine in exchange for guarantees 
regarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The treaty was more for the 
three great powers at the table than it was for Ukraine, a country that just 
happened to be holding almost 2,000 nuclear weapons when the Soviet Union 
collapsed. In the Budapest Memorandum the US, UK, and Russia agreed that 
they wouldn’t use economic coercion to influence Ukraine nor would they 
occupy Ukrainian territory militarily. If military occupation did occur it would 
be considered illegal and the nations would consult to resolve any questions 
concerning the commitments identified in the document.
35
 Twenty years later, 
the Budapest Memorandum would become null and void in any practical sense 
when the invasion and annexation of Crimea and Russia’s admission of its 
involvement in these events was met with a lot of diplomatic bluster from the 
West, but almost nothing of actual substance beyond economic sanctions. The 
ramifications of those actions weren’t felt solely by Russia. For many of the 
smaller countries in Central Asia and the Black Sea region “it became 
understood that institutions of international guarantees on the example of the 
Budapest Memorandum of 1994 do not work, and the US and Britain failed to 
fulfill their obligations towards Ukraine”.36 To the Americans, the British, and 
the Russians, the Budapest Memorandum is just one agreement in an ongoing 
process that dates back to the Yalta Accords following World War II. For the 
less powerful states, the Russian invasion had a much more profound impact. 
Leonid Kuchma, the former president of Ukraine who signed the Budapest 
Memorandum for Ukraine, said that Ukraine had been “cheated” 37, while 
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said that the actions of Russia proved that 
“international law is merely a tool for powerful states to force the weaker states 
to do what they want”.38 After the West offered minimal resistance to Russia’s 
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actions in Crimea, the perception of the international order shifted. Russia was 
emboldened to take further action to cement its gains in Crimea. 
Andrey Kurkov writes in Ukraine Diaries, “I am…an ethnically 
Russian citizen of Ukraine. But I am not ‘a Russian,” because I have nothing in 
common with Russia and its politics”.39 The concept of “Russia and its politics” 
that Kurkov references is a complex phenomenon that can’t be adequately 
discussed in only a few pages. It is worthwhile, nevertheless, to momentarily 
consider those aspects of Russian politics that are relevant to its approach to 
international relations and A2/AD. The devastation and subjugation caused by 
the Mongol Hordes permanently affected the psyche of the Russian people and 
serve as a bridge between the cultural history of Russia and its political history 
and ideology. The Mongols themselves left Eastern Europe nearly 1,000 years 
ago and their descendants in Central Asia, while sometimes a nuisance, have 
rarely been a serious threat to remove Russia from its position of preeminent 
power. This long-term reign in a position of power hasn’t been enough for the 
Russians to escape their past with regards to the Mongols whose physical retreat 
was not accompanied by a coinciding psychological withdraw. This 
psychological impact is ever-present in Russian foreign policy creating a 
worldview and ideology encompassed by the idea that “after the Mongol 
invasion and rule all Russian politics were post-traumatic”.40 At different times 
throughout history Russian foreign policy has been summed up as “the red 
fortress,” “the Soviet fortress,” “the nationalist fortress,” “the besieged 
fortress,” and most recently “fortress Russia”.41 When examining Russian 
foreign policy, this idea of Russia as a fortress is an inescapable and recurring 
theme; the word kremlin itself derives from the Russian word for “citadel”. It is 
the base that underlies nearly every other decision and facet of Russia’s foreign 
policy. Outsiders conquered Russia once and the government must never let that 
happen again. The Russian Fortress is both ideological and physical; it attempts 
to conquer and control both territories and minds. It both protects and promotes 
Russia throughout Central Asia and the world. A fortress is designed for 
protection, but it’s also a symbol of power, and in the Leninist and Stalinist set 
of core values still prevalent in Russian government today, “expansion is the 
embodiment of power”.42 In this way, territorial expansion becomes a central 
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aspect of Russian foreign policy, of “Fortress Russia”, but those in charge must 
always be careful to play the role of the victim. Expansion can’t be about 
imperialism or domination, it is expressed in terms of protecting the Russian 
people, culture, interests, and way of life from outside forces that would seek to 
destroy it. Those outside forces constantly seeking to destroy Russia must not 
only be prevented from reaching the heart of Russia in Moscow but must also 
be stopped from any encroachment on the Russian way of life. The Kremlin is 
not only the protector of Russia, but of all Russians everywhere. Through this 
line of thinking, the Russian diaspora becomes a consistent crutch and key 
aspect of Russian foreign policy. 
 When trying to optimize its diaspora as a foreign policy tool, “the 
political establishment oscillates between an attempt to instrumentalize the 
Russian diaspora for the purpose of projecting Russia’s power on its neighbors 
and the fear that Russian diaspora would develop into a ‘shadow’ Russia, 
capable of questioning the legitimacy of the Kremlin”.43 In spite of these 
potential threats, Russia has still devoted considerable energy to coopting its 
diaspora since the collapse of the Soviet Union. From 1992-1994, the “Yeltsin 
Doctrine” or “the Russian Monroe Doctrine” offered protection for the human 
rights of Russian-speaking minorities in former Soviet states and allowed 
Russia to intervene politically or militarily, if necessary, to protect the interests 
and rights of that diaspora. It was a valuable tool in attempting to maintain 
Russian influence over the domestic affairs of the former Soviet Union.
44
 Under 
President Putin this idea continued to flourish starting in 2001 with the signing 
of “The Conception for Support of Compatriots” and the First International 
Congress of Compatriots.
45
 According to Russian policy, the term compatriot as 
used in these and other situations includes, “Russian Federation citizens living 
abroad, former citizens of the USSR, Russian immigrants from the Soviet 
Union or the Russian Federation, descendants of compatriots, and foreign 
citizens who admire Russian culture and language”.46 Operating with such an 
expansive definition of what constitutes a member of the Russian diaspora 
allows the Kremlin to essentially act wherever and however it desires in the 
name of national interest and protecting the human rights of ethnic Russians in 
its diaspora. In the post-Soviet world Russia traditionally used soft power 
methods to increase its sphere of influence with regards to its diaspora, but it 
has always reserved the right since the days of the “Yeltsin Doctrine” to act 
militarily if necessary, and its recent actions in Crimea demonstrate a 
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willingness to use hard power methods if they’re considered necessary or 
useful.
47
 “Fortress Russia” presents itself as always willing to protect its diaspora 
whenever needed, which impacts its use of A2/AD as a tool of its foreign policy. 
Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has never seen itself as 
anything other than a great power that deserves “particular rights within its 
immediate region, a special role in deciding international disputes, cooperation 
with other great powers, and a greater degree of autonomy or sovereignty.”48 
Whereas the United States and the West view the Soviet Union’s actions in 
Eastern Europe as a violation of the Yalta Agreement that played a large role in 
the development of the Cold War, Russia similarly views the US with suspicion 
because of NATO’s expansion to the east. There’s a famous story, though it’s 
perhaps apocryphal, that in 1990 US Secretary of State James Baker told Soviet 
Premier Mikhail Gorbachev that “if he pulled Soviet troops out of East 
Germany and permitted the peaceful reunion of the two Germanys, NATO, in 
return, would not move ‘one inch east’.”49 From Russia’s point-of-view, the fact 
that NATO has moved thousands of miles east since 1990 is both a challenge to 
its interests in the “near abroad,” a threat to its security, and the infringement of 
a gentlemen’s agreement between the US and the Soviet Union. This idea has 
been revisited multiple times during the intervening 30 years of US-Soviet 
relations. President Boris Yeltsin told President Bill Clinton in 1997, “Our 
position has not changed. It remains a mistake for NATO to move eastward.”50 
President Vladimir Putin has spoken consistently against NATO enlargement as 
a direct threat to Russian interests and the 2008 announcement that NATO 
would eventually accept Ukraine and Georgia as members played a crucial role 
in Putin’s decision to invade Georgia in order to display power, demand respect, 
and maintain control in Russia’s sphere of influence. NATO enlargement is the 
Russian counter to western accusations of the post-Yalta Eastern Bloc and is the 
preexisting justification for its actions violating the Budapest Memorandum and 
invading Ukraine. In the Russian mind, Yalta divided Europe and, though the 
Soviet Union no longer exists, Russian interests still do. 
 
 
Decoding The Russian Military A2/AD Footprint 
In The Black Sea 
 
Following the Russians eventual expulsion of the Mongols and the 
founding of the Tsarist Empire, “the driving force of Russian civilization 
became the avoidance of and preparation for the next invasion,” which “induces 
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suspicion and conservatism, xenophobia, paranoia, and an imperialism that 
seeks to buffer the heartland with as much territory as possible”.51 This succinct 
statement is not only the core of Russian psychology, but also the essence of 
what motivates and perpetuates Russian A2/AD. The constant, lurking fear that 
an invader is always at the gates and ready to conquer Mother Russia in the 
briefest moment of weakness manifests itself in a protectionist and expansionist 
foreign policy and an offensive, “kill or be killed” approach to international 
relations. 
Since 2014 and continuing in the present, Russia has been working to 
expand its A2/AD bubble and “the modernization of the Black Sea Fleet and the 
deployment of new weapons systems on the captured peninsula…will 
strengthen Moscow’s ability to challenge NATO’s presence and undermine the 
security of littoral states”.52 As of now, “Russia has A2/AD in Kaliningrad, 
Crimea, and Syria, and analysts have been arguing whether this…is a new 
modus operandi for Russia” .53 Clearly, A2/AD is a method of defense that 
Russia intends to use well into the future and its efforts in Crimea and Syria 
have significantly enhanced those capabilities. 
The Iskander-M, known to NATO as the SS-26, is a weapon system 
with a range between 400 kilometers (250 miles) and 480 kilometers (300 
miles) according to various sources. It has been operationally deployed in both 
Syria
54
 and Crimea,
55
 and sources state that Israeli intelligence has reported 
possible launches of an Iskander-M missile against ISIS forces from Latakia Air 
Base Syria.
56
 A system with this range can have a significant impact on the 
ability of forces to penetrate into territory that is controlled by either Russia or 
countries allied with Russia. An Iskander system in Crimea could reach NATO 
member states Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania depending on its range and 
specific location in Crimea. An Iskander-M based at Sevastopol would be able 
to hit Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base in Romania, a key forward operating base 
                                               
51  Richard Lourie, Putin…cit., p. 131.  
52  Janusz Bugajski and Peter B. Doran, “Black Sea Rising: Russia’s Strategy in Southeast 
Europe”, Center for European Policy Analysis, February 2016, p. 11.  
53  Riina Kaljurand, “The Annexation of Crimea and its Implications for the Baltic States’ 
Security”,  Andis Kudors (ed.), Fortress Russia: Political, Economic, and Security 
Development in Russia Following the Annexation of Crimea and its Consequences for the 
Baltic States, Centre for East European Policy Studies, Riga, 2016, pp. 177-178.  
54  Tamir Eshel, “New Evidence of Russian Iskander-M Missile Deployment in Syria”, 
Defense Update, 6 ianuarie 2017, http://defense-update.com/20170106_iskander-in-
syria.html. (Accessed 17 May 2018). 
55  Interfax-Ukraine, “Ukraine Military say Russia Deploys Iskander Air Defense Missiles in 
Crimea”, Kyiv Post, 4 December 2014, https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/war-
against-ukraine/ukraine-military-say-russia-deploys-iskander-air-defense-missiles-in-
crimea-374075.html. (Accessed 17 May 2018). 
56  Ami Rojkes Dombe, “Possible Iskander Missile Launch in Syria”, Israel Defense, 26 
January 2017, http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/28346. (Accessed 17 May 2018). 
492  OCTAVIAN MANEA, TAYLOR FRANCIS 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XVIII  no. 3 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
for US and NATO forces. As far back as 1992, Indian Brigadier General V.K. 
Nair said that access to forward basing would be “by far the trickiest part of the 
American operational problem.”57An Iskander system in Sevastopol can take 
advantage of this exact problem by denying free usage of a critical NATO base 
in Romania. 
While elite ground forces and long-range surface-to-surface ballistic 
missiles can gain, control, and hold ground, one of the ways they are most 
vulnerable is via attack from the air. Similarly, centers of gravity that can’t be 
reached by land forces or land-based ballistic missile systems are subject to 
attack from aircraft whose range can extend for hundreds of miles or even 
thousands of miles with air-to-air refueling. Due to the susceptibility of ground 
forces and high-value strategic targets to aerial attack and the devastating 
impact that can result, it becomes imperative for a developed, effective A2/AD 
network to include aerial defenses. These defenses must be able to meet, attrite, 
and ideally defeat adversary air forces at sufficient distances that they never 
become threatening to one’s protected territory. Although, early warning radar 
systems are a critical part of any Integrated Air Defense System (IADS), the 
concentration with regards to Russian A2/AD will be on the other major 
components of their IADS, namely their fighter and bomber aircraft and their 
SAM systems. 
The first layer of A2/AD protection in the air domain comes from 
aircraft that have the ability to fly long distances and threaten and attack both 
adversarial air and ground assets. In November 2014, Sputnik announced that 
ten Su-27SM “Flanker” and four Su-30 “Flanker-C” had been dispatched to 
Crimea.
58
 The Su-30 is a newer, upgraded model of the Su-27SM, but both 
aircraft are fourth-generation fighter jets and among the best, most lethal aircraft 
in Russia’s inventory. They have an effective range of over 3,500 kilometers 
(1,900 miles) depending on their weapons configuration, and both jets can carry 
a combination of up to ten air-to-air missiles including the advanced AA-10 
“Alamo” infrared missile and AA-11 “Archer” semi-active radar missile 
capable of destroying enemy air assets at reported ranges of greater than 80 
kilometers (50 miles). Almost a year later, in September 2015, Newsweek 
reported a plan for Crimea to receive thirty new Su-30SM aircraft.
59
 The Su-
30SM is a slightly modified version of the Su-30 aircraft received in 2014, but 
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with similar weaponry and ranges. Most telling is that the number increased 
sevenfold from four to thirty over the course of just one year, and that these 
aircraft are among the newest and most advanced aircraft in the Russian 
inventory. When they were deployed to Crimea, in 2015, Russia had just begun 
ordering and operationalizing its first large number of Su-30SM aircraft after 
successful test runs in 2012.
60
 Russia was clearly making a statement to the 
international community, particularly the US and EU, that Crimea was a part of 
Russia and that it would use its most advanced, expensive, and capable assets in 
order to defend territory that it considered its own. 
Along with fighter aircraft, Russia has also deployed a squadron of Tu-
22M3 “Backfire-C” bombers as well as Tu-95 “Bear” and Su-34 “Fullback” 
aircraft.
61
 Although, the Su-34 is technically classified as a fighter because of its 
ability to engage other aircraft in air-to-air conflict, its primary focus is on air-
to-ground engagements. Not only is the Su-34 capable of carrying laser guided 
and GLONASS satellite guided bombs, “those weapons are…almost 
exclusively carried by the Su-34”.62 The ability to use precision weapons allows 
for greater specificity when targeting objectives that can mitigate collateral 
damage and increase the odds of hitting the appropriate target. This feature can 
be extremely valuable when targeting ships as it allows for precise placement of 
the weapon to maximize damage to the ship’s frame or to key command and 
control areas of the ship. The deployment of the bombers has left some analysts 
confused as there doesn’t appear to be a strategic purpose for them in Crimea.63 
However, recently Russia ran an exercise using Tu-95 airplanes to bomb 
strategic targets within Ukraine.
64
 It’s not a difficult logical leap to see this as 
preparation or training for a potential strategic bombing raid in NATO countries 
bordering the Black Sea. Perhaps more importantly, the Tu-22M3 and Tu-95 are 
capable of carrying Kh-101 and Kh-102 cruise missiles, which have a reported 
range of up to 4,000 kilometers (2,500 miles).
65
 Russia used both the Kh-101 
and the older Kh-555 in Syria launched from Tu-95 bombers and, although 
there appear to be temporary setbacks in terms of the expected performance of 
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one or both air-launched cruise missiles,
66
 it’s anticipated that Russia will make 
any desired or required modifications and bring the cruise missiles back into the 
inventory as quickly as possible. The A2/AD implications of these bombers 
with these weapons in Crimea are readily apparent. A bomber such as the Tu-
22M3 or Tu-95 could stay in Russian airspace, or even over international waters 
in the Black Sea, Baltic Sea, or Atlantic Ocean and fire air-launched cruise 
missiles with the ability to reach nearly any target in Europe. It’s unlikely that 
this type of scenario would occur, and such an attack would indicate a transition 
from A2/AD to offensive operations, but the vast range of these weapons is 
something NATO and the US must consider when permanently basing or 
mobilizing troops. 
The final, and perhaps most important, part of Russia’s A2/AD 
defenses in the air domain comes from their technologically advanced, 
extremely effective, and highly lethal surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. 
Russia possesses both the S-300 (NATO: SA-10 or SA-20 depending on the 
variant) and S-400 (NATO: SA-21) SAM systems. Later variants of the S-300 
had improved warheads, better guidance systems, and the ability to engage 
targets at a range of 200 kilometers (125 miles). The S-400 is a drastic upgrade 
over even these impressive numbers. Russian claims suggest that the S-400 can 
simultaneously engage up to 36 targets of various sizes ranging from aircraft all 
the way down to cruise missiles at ranges of up to 400 kilometers (250 miles).
67
 
Nevertheless, the S-400 has been deployed to Latakia,
68
 the S-300 was 
sent to Tartus in 2016,
69
 and both weapon systems have been observed on the 
Crimean Peninsula including two S-400 battalions, one outside Feodosia and 
one near Sevastopol.
70
 Such highly advanced systems with incredible ranges 
pose a significant threat and are inordinately valuable from an A2/AD 
perspective. These types of SAMs “would significantly improve Russian 
A2/AD capability…by enabling wide-area and highly responsive antiair 
coverage while simultaneously decreasing the demands on Russian fighters to 
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maintain combat air patrols”.71 The systems’ radars could track aircraft, drones, 
or missiles nearly from the moment of takeoff or launch and either force them 
to retreat or destroy them if they got close enough to become threatening, all 
without requiring the costs and risks entailed with sending expensive fighter 
aircraft to engage in aerial combat. One of the few ways to attack such a system 
is by saturating its radar picture, but that would require a significant investment 
of financial and material resources that the adversary might not be willing to 
make. This is the entire purpose of A2/AD zones, not to ultimately defeat the 
enemy, but to discourage a stronger enemy from attacking. The immense range 
and highly sophisticated targeting capabilities of the S-300 and S-400 make 
them incredibly important pieces of the Russian A2/AD system in the Black Sea 
and Eastern Mediterranean zones. 
However, the most valuable domain for Russia’s A2/AD operations in 
the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean zones is probably at sea. As Ilan 
Berman wrote regarding the “distinctly military project” of annexing Crimea –  
 
“The Crimean city of Sevastopol has long served as the home port for Russia’s Black 
Sea Fleet (via a long-term lease from the Ukrainian government), and the region is vital 
to Russia’s ability to project naval might. Moscow’s annexation of the territory has 
been followed by a major, systematic expansion of Russia’s military presence there—
and, by extension, in the Black Sea region”.72 
 
The Black Sea Fleet in its present composition includes 45 warships and 7 
submarines, which comprises slightly more than 20% of the entire Russian 
naval fleet. Of those, ships and submarines, nearly 90% are in Crimea – 80% at 
Sevastopol and 9% at Feodosia.
73
 Two new ships, Zelyonly Dol and Serpukov, 
joined the Black Sea Fleet in late 2015. Each ship was outfitted with the Kalibr-
NK missile system that can fire either 3M54 (NATO: SS-N-27 “Sizzler”) anti-
ship cruise missiles (ASCM) at a range of up to 250 kilometers (155 miles) or 
3M-14 (NATO: SS-N-30A “Kalibr”) land attack cruise missiles (LACM) up to 
2,500 kilometers (1,550 miles).
74
 Incorporating these upgrades, along with its 
six Kilo-class submarines in the Black Sea, means that there are no nearby 
countries with a competitive or comparable navy to that posed by the Black Sea 
Fleet.
75
 Similarly, the Kalibr-NK missile system has been employed and is still 
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available for use in both the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean by the 
Black Sea Fleet and its 15-ship Mediterranean Task Force,
76
 which creates a 
massive A2/AD bubble for both land and sea forces that encompasses all of 
Eastern Europe and most of the Mediterranean Sea. 
In addition to its naval modernization efforts through the State Arms 
Procurement program of 2011-2020 (SAP 2020) under which Moscow will 
spend $151 billion on its entire navy and $2.4 billion on the Black Sea Fleet 
alone by 2020,
77
 Russia has also established coastal defense missile systems in 
Crimea and Syria. The coastal missile defense is primarily provided by the 
Bastion-P (NATO: SS-C-5) system which is capable of launching the P-800 
Oniks (NATO: SS-N-26) ASCM with a maximum range of 300 kilometers (186 
miles).
78
 The mere presence of the P-800 Oniks in Syria, without factoring in 
Russian ships or other ASCM or LACM weapons, “has been enough to create a 
surface naval A2/AD zone in the northeastern corner of the Mediterranean”.79 
The coastal defense systems in Syria and Crimea add one more layer of defense 
to an already complex and effective A2/AD system.  
Even without a highly detailed analysis, it’s still evident that the 
multiple layers and extended ranges of the weapon systems within the military 
element of Russia’s A2/AD operation across the land, air, and sea domains do 
not form an impenetrable wall around the border. They do, however, pose a 
formidable threat that must be respected. Russia is not invincible, but it doesn’t 
have to be. The Kremlin just needs to make the cost of attack outweigh the 
benefits of victory. The annexation of Crimea, the alliance with Syria, and the 
expansion and use of advanced military equipment in those areas are critically 
important steps in achieving that objective. 
 
 
Implications For The NATO Members In The Black Sea 
 
Events in international relations don’t occur in a vacuum and their 
ramifications extend beyond their borders to impact an entire geographic zone. 
Such is the case now as Russia’s establishment of an A2/AD zone based out of 
Crimea and Syria has significant repercussions for the Black Sea region as a 
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whole. After the fall of Communism, the West’s interest in the Black Sea region 
as a strategic location declined, while Moscow still required its warm water 
ports and viewed it as the same “Russian Lake” it had always been in the 
Russian worldview. Over time, the strategic value of the Black Sea region has 
grown in the West, but while NATO and the EU have a vested interest in the 
Black Sea region and in protecting their member states located in that area, 
there is still a distinct difference in the way the Black Sea region is generally 
viewed by the West and by Russia. As Martin Sokolov explains, “The EU sees 
it as its neighborhood where, along with its current members, lie opportunities 
for cooperation; Russia, per contra, sees it as its front porch and is not allowing 
any trespassers”.80 This dichotomy drives extremely different policies in the 
Black Sea region. 
The drastic gap between a friendly area to do business and one’s home 
that must be protected for survival not only exists between Russia and the EU, 
but also between the EU as a whole and the individual member states in the 
Black Sea region whose survival is threatened by an expansionist Russia. This 
makes sense as the smaller states in the Black Sea region suffer much swifter 
and more devastating consequences based on Russia’s actions. Russian A2/AD 
and its supporting activities can be problematic or even damage some of the 
foreign policy interests of the United States and the EU members from Western 
Europe, but “for small states it could mean the loss of their very existence as 
sovereign entities. This is particularly problematic for small powers on the 
frontier that have no sufficient power to protect them from aggression in even 
its earliest phases.”81 These states have histories with Russia that go back 
hundreds of years. The expansionism of the Tsarist and Soviet empires has not 
been forgotten and Russia is always eyed warily by the Black Sea states. Not 
only has Putin begun actively taking steps that are all too familiar – invading 
states, annexing territories, and sending Russian troops permanently to other 
sovereign territories – he has started adding an A2/AD bubble in the Black Sea 
and Eastern Mediterranean, which is a new challenge for Black Sea states. 
Technically, to counterbalance and defend yourself against the A2/AD 
capabilities of a regional great power, the solution requires to invest and 
develop your own access-denial posture.
82
 It is like a defensive conservation 
instinct. It has increasingly become the choice of many of the US allies across 
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the globe – Australia, Japan and Poland. It is also an option actively encouraged 
in Washington:  
 
“what we need right now are allies on the frontlines in Europe and East Asia that really 
focus on defending their own sovereignty. In the past we wanted our allies to be a 
smaller version of the US military. Today we want our allies to look a lot like our 
adversaries, to develop their own A2/AD capabilities, to fend off the power projection 
gambits of potential aggressors”.83 
 
Poland is a case in point. It is a country that designed its whole defensive 
philosophy around an A2/AD centric posture with the aim of transforming its 
territory into “a sanctuary for the allied freedom of movement”, with a 
component of deterrence by denial to discourage any Russian move against it. 
This is a traditional logic first advertised by the architect of the containment 
strategy, George Kennan: “we must be like the porcupine who only gradually 
convinces the carnivorous beast of prey that he is not a fit object of attack”.84A 
gradual “porcupine” deterrence posture (or even “deterrence via protraction”85) 
is also the logic that drives Romanian military acquisitions. The terminology 
has been introduced in the public talking points of the senior military leadership 
of the country. In the last few years, Bucharest made clear its interest to develop 
an IAMD (Integrated Air Missile Defense) system, acquire Patriot batteries and 
HIMARS rocket launchers as well as to invest in coastal defense. It is even 
contemplating developing a fleet of submarines. 
Two of the three NATO countries in the Black Sea region haven’t taken 
many steps to create A2/AD umbrellas over their territory. Worse, they’ve made 
decisions and taken actions that appear to distance themselves from NATO in 
favor of Russia, or at a minimum try to balance the two against one another 
instead of clearly allying against Russian expansion in the Black Sea area. 
Bulgaria’s actions have been particularly problematic as it has “maintained 
especially close ties to Russia in the period since its NATO entry”.86 
Furthermore, “Bulgaria still appears to be the weakest link in the Western 
alliance…[and] to be less worried about possible Russian aggression and more 
about angering policy makers in the Kremlin”.87 It was the Bulgarian Prime 
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Minister Boyko Borisov who put an end to a proposed tripartite naval alliance 
between Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania in 2016 by saying it was “not 
acceptable” without much further discussion as to why.88Borisov is still Prime 
Minister, but in 2016 a pro-Russian Socialist, Rumen Radev, won the Bulgarian 
presidency. Though Borisov is more supportive of the EU than Radev and the 
Socialists, both have called for a demilitarization of the Black Sea. Considering 
the modernization of the Black Sea Fleet and Russia’s exploits in Crimea, the 
demilitarization of the Black Sea would essentially result in a powerful Russian 
fleet with almost no NATO presence to act as a deterrent.
89
 Belgian leadership 
is trying to balance its EU and NATO membership with a pragmatic, 
submissive approach towards Russia. 
Turkey, despite its war-filled history with Russia over access and 
control in the Black Sea, has also yielded significant geopolitical ground to 
Russia in recent years. Russia’s treatment of Crimean Tatars, the closest ethnic 
relatives to Turks, has been abysmal. In Syria, Russia fought against the 
Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army and supported Assad and the People’s 
Protection Units (YPG) who are opposed by Turkey. Russia also has refused to 
recognize the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as a terrorist organization, 
which Turkey claims they are, and Russian aircraft have repeatedly violated 
Turkish airspace. Russia has proven time after time that its “interests in Syria 
are Russia’s interests and not those of the wider international community”. 90 
Russo-Turkish relations reached a low point following the downing of a 
Russian Su-24 in Turkish airspace by a Turkish F-16 in 2015. Russia quickly 
responded with crippling economic sanctions.
91
 However, Turkish President 
Recep Erdogan later apologized for the incident and Russia was the first 
country to emphatically support his regime during the attempted coup of 2016.
92
 
These diplomatic gestures improved relations to the point that, in 2017, Russia 
lifted most of its economic sanctions and the two countries signed a $2.5 
billion-dollar agreement for Turkey to receive an S-400 SAM system. Turkey 
will be the only NATO country with a Russian SAM system and its integration 
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into NATO defense is a cause of concern for many NATO leaders.
93
 Air 
defense systems are an important part of A2/AD, but the S-400 isn’t likely to 
deter any Russian aggression in the Black Sea. Turkey is still a NATO ally and 
still hosts US troops and equipment at Incirlik Air Base, but Erdogan is most 
concerned about consolidating his power; the power of Russia’s economic 
sanctions and the lack of Western support following the coup has led him to 
look more favorably towards Russia. Moscow’s efforts in Turkey aren’t new to 
international relations:  
 
“the revisionist’s low-level cunning diplomacy that silently recruits allies to its side 
through elite bribery, internal destabilization, or economic pressuring is dangerous 
because it happens surreptitiously, and its effects are visible only when it becomes too 
late to alter them,” write Jakob Grygiel and Wess Mitchell.94 
 
Increasingly close economic and political ties to Russia combined with 
diplomatic discord concerning the US and NATO makes Turkey a less reliable 
ally in the fight against Russian aggression and A2/AD development in the 
Black Sea region. 
Romania, ever skeptical of Russian invasion, is at the vanguard of the 
aforementioned attempts to preserve its sovereignty and survival for as long as 
possible against the stronger Russian foe. Nearly all of the Central and Eastern 
European countries, Romania included, announced increases in their defense 
spending following the annexation of Crimea in 2014 with Slovakia being the 
lone exception.
95
 However, Romania subsequently went further than most of its 
neighbors and announced in 2017 that it would become the sixth NATO country 
to meet the standard set at the 2014 Wales Summit of spending 2% of national 
GDP towards national defense.
96
 It has maintained this policy despite concerns 
that domestic fiscal policies could be leading to economic problems for 
Romania in the near future and as inflation has recently hit 5%, its highest level 
since 2013,
97
 which is an indication of how seriously it views the Russian threat 
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to its national security. Deciding to devote the necessary resources is important, 
but allocating them in the right manner is even more important. Spending your 
entire budget on fifth-generation fighter aircraft, for example, doesn’t make 
sense if you don’t have the aviation expertise to fly them or the maintenance 
capability to keep them airborne. 
Romania has effectively started implementing this plan already. In 
November 2017, Romania officially approved the purchase of seven Patriot 
missile defense systems and accompanying missiles from the United States at a 
cost that could total up to $3.9 billion USD.
98
 This contract was closely 
followed by the Romanian Government’s decision in February 2018 to spend 
over $1.5 billion USD to purchase three High Mobility Artillery Rocket 
Systems (HIMARS) from the United States.
99
 The Patriot purchase gained a lot 
of notoriety because of its cost and because of the fame of the Patriot as a 
reliable and effective missile defense system. However, the HIMARS purchase 
might be more noteworthy because it’s an offensive weapon system capable of 
firing six rockets up to 70 kilometers (43 miles) or one missile up to 300 
kilometers (186 miles). This is the same range as the Bastion-P system and 75% 
of the range of the Russian Iskander-M system deployed to Crimea. Although, 
the HIMARS system can’t reach Crimea from Romania, it’s long range 
capability and rapid movement capability allow the Romanian military to 
station the missiles inland, well-protected by the Carpathian Mountains, and 
still provide coverage and protection against a potential coastal invasion from 
the Black Sea. In addition, the US Marine Corps was able to fire a HIMARS 
from a seaborne ship in October 2017, the first time this was achieved.
100
 
If Romania was able to put its HIMARS systems on ships and send 
them into the Black Sea, they could easily hit Crimea and have a much stronger 
deterrent effect on Russia. Furthermore, Romania is using its status as a NATO 
member and its strategically important geopolitical position to improve its 
A2/AD umbrella. In 2014, Romania offered its territory as a location to host the 
United States Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System (AAMDS) in Deveselu. 
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This system is part of the United States’ European Phased Adapted Approach 
(EPAA) designed to provide ballistic missile defense to NATO and US allies in 
Europe against attacks from potential revisionist powers such as Russia and 
achieved initial operational capability in 2016.
101
 In 2017, Romania established 
Headquarters Multinational Brigade – Southeast (HQ MN BDE-SE) in Craiova. 
Minister of Defense Mihai Fifor has stated his desire to have HQ MN BDE-SE 
fully operational by the end of 2018 and that he hopes an organization of this 
size and value will lead to “US troops’ presence…in a rotational manner, but 
for a longer period of time…because for Romania it’s important both the US 
presence and that of other states.”102 Just like Russia, the Romanian government 
understands the value of troop presence as part of an A2/AD campaign. Since 
Romania’s military alone is not large enough to dissuade potential Russian 
aggression, bringing in additional NATO troops and having them permanently 
present on Romanian territory augments and fortifies a key part of Romania’s 
A2/AD bubble against Russia. All of these measures haven’t put Romania on 
equal footing with Russia, but they have made a notable impression. Senior 
foreign ministry official Alexander Botsan-Kharchenko recently said, 
“Romania’s stance and the stance of its leadership, who have turned the country 
into an outpost, is a clear threat for us” .103 
There are still additional steps that Romania can and should take to 
strengthen its A2/AD presence in the Black Sea. Improved infrastructure 
including modernized highway and railroad transportation systems would allow 
for rapid deployment of Romanian troops stationed throughout the country and 
would profoundly enhance Romania’s ability to effectively optimize the rapid 
mobility features of the HIMARS system. As it stands now, the Romanian 
infrastructure system is a detriment to the type of troop and equipment mobility 
necessary to run an effective A2/AD operation. Another issue is Defense 
Minister Mihai Fifor’s recently announced plan to build three new submarines 
in a Romanian shipyard will be a boost to Romania’s defense industry but is not 
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the best expense at the present time.
104
 The submarines will be expensive to 
build and to maintain and it will take several years before Romanian sailors will 
be able to operate the submarines at a highly efficient level. The design of the 
submarines is for offense more than defense, and Romania doesn’t have an 
expansionist military mindset or capability. Furthermore, they’ll likely have 
limited impact facing the six Kilo-class submarines that Russia currently has in 
its Black Sea Fleet. Mining and other anti-submarine warfare (ASW) measures 
along the Romanian coast would be a more effective and much cheaper 
deterrent to Russian action in the Black Sea and along the Romanian coast. A 
final investment for Romania should be GLONASS jamming equipment. 
GLONASS jamming, as with GPS jamming is cheap and can be acquired 
through commercial means. Strategic application of GLONASS jamming zones 
can be a severe detriment to Russian designs to use precision strike weapons, 
GLONASS navigation in airplanes, or GLONASS-guided cruise missiles. 
These and similar upgrades would allow the Romanian Government to 
effectively use its budgetary allotment to create a viable and effective A2/AD 
bubble that could deter Russian revisionism in the Black Sea region and provide 
sufficient time for NATO reinforcements to arrive in the case of an attempted 
Russian invasion. 
 
 
Implications For The Alliance 
 
As NATO and the EU have gradually extended their borders eastward, 
Russia now finds itself sharing the Black Sea with states that cannot compete 
with Russia individually, but can cause immense headaches as part of larger 
international organizations. All three countries have participated in joint 
exercises with NATO member countries and especially Bulgaria and Romania 
have historically invited and enjoyed the increased military presence in the 
Black Sea region.
105
 However, as previously noted the level of support for 
NATO measures has been tempered in Bulgaria and Turkey and Russian 
revisionism is starting to change the geopolitical appearance of the region. 
In international relations not only is it true that perception is reality, but, 
often, reality itself is negotiable. For an organization such as NATO or a 
country such as the US with global reach and global interests, there are two 
critical ways in which perception matters: credibility and reliability. The 
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perception of credibility is given by the adversarial or revisionist power (e.g. 
Russia), while the perception of reliability is relevant vis-à-vis the smaller allied 
states. A report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 
explains, “There are 2 elements of credibility: intent and capability. Intent is 
based on the adversary’s perception that the defender will make good on what it 
says it will do. Capability refers to the adversary’s perception that the defender 
can make good on its commitments”.106 The larger states’ reliability is 
determined based on how the smaller allies view its commitment to them. If the 
commitment, and by proxy the reliability, is considered low, then it creates a 
belief among the weaker states “that the alliance is fragile and that it may be in 
the small state’s interest to seek accommodation with the nearby revisionist 
power”.107 Immediately following the annexation of Crimea, Turkey and 
Bulgaria still seemed to trust NATO, but their recent decisions, especially since 
2016, indicate a low perception of reliability and a possible turn towards the 
regionalism of an expansionist Russia. 
In some ways, these views may be justified. Russia has turned the tide 
in the Syrian war, allowing the government to retake Aleppo and severely 
crippling the anti-Assad resistance. It has maintained and cemented its control 
of Crimea. It was able to play a subversive role in the 2016 US Presidential 
election creating a political firestorm in the United States that is still 
undermining America’s traditional role in international politics nearly two years 
later. It has modernized and expanded its once powerful Black Sea Fleet, and it 
has substantially grown its A2/AD bubble in the Black Sea zone and the Eastern 
Mediterranean. It has achieved all of these goals with little resistance from the 
West beyond sanctions that, while relentless and damaging, don’t even have the 
full support of every NATO ally. The West must recognize that Putin views 
Russia as a great power determined to be treated as such internationally, 
understand that its smaller allies don’t have the luxury of time or economic 
power, and must adapt its approach accordingly to reassure its allies in the 
Black Sea region and Eastern Mediterranean.  
 This predicament is even direr after the July 2018 NATO summit in 
Brussels when the Black Sea focus remained at the very least marginal. The 
summit main lines of efforts prioritized measures to increase mobility, speed as 
well as NATO’s operational freedom of movement across the Alliance territory. 
It seems that the time for a Black Sea focus has not come. Romania’s call for a 
coherent, integrated, synchronized approach for the whole Eastern Flank, one 
that will fix the perceived imbalance between the Nordic and Southern parts of 
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Eastern Flank, remained largely ignored. It is in this context that former NATO 
generals are pleading for a renewed focus on the Black Sea, a region that  
 
“is just as important as the Baltic Sea. We’ve done a lot in the Baltic region. I believe 
the Black Sea region is going to be the key area where Russia will challenge the 
Alliance over the next 10-15 years and we’ve got to ensure credible deterrence there as 
well as provide support for our partners in the region”.108 
 
                                               
108  Octavian Manea, “A Tour of Horizon Interview with Lieutenant General Ben 
Hodges…cit.”. 
